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On April 17, 2024, the United States Supreme Court (“the Court”) released its opinion in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, No. 22-193 (Apr. 17, 2024).[1]  In Muldrow, the Court clarified the standard to be used “in addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers.”[2] This opinion provides important guidance on an issue we often encounter.

As the Court noted, “Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman.”[3]  Sergeant Muldrow brought suit under Title VII alleging she was discriminated against based on her sex.[4]  The lower courts rejected her claim “on the ground that the transfer did not cause Muldrow a ‘significant’ employment disadvantage.”[5]  Other courts previously utilized a similar standard in such Title VII job transfer cases.[6]  The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that “[a]lthough an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.  Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar.”[7]

Sergeant Muldrow served as a plainclothes officer in the Intelligence Division from 2008 through 2017.[8]  Against Muldrow’s wishes, she was transferred out of the Intelligence Division.[9]  The new commander wanted to replace Muldrow, whom he sometimes called “‘Mrs.’” instead of the customary “‘Sergeant,’” with a male officer.[10]  Muldrow was reassigned to a uniformed job in another division.[11] Muldrow’s responsibilities, perks, and schedule changed in the new role.[12]  Muldrow also lost her status as an FBI task force officer and the vehicle that came with that title.[13]  Muldrow alleged that the City changed her position because of her sex.[14]  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.[15]  The Court agreed to review the matter “to resolve a Circuit split over whether an employee challenging a transfer under Title VII must meet a heightened threshold of harm—be it dubbed significant, serious, or something similar.”[16]

In reversing the lower courts, the Court began with the statutory language of Title VII.[17]  The Court noted that the pertinent provision of Title VII “prohibits ‘discriminat[ing] against’ an individual ‘with respect to’ the ‘terms [or] conditions’ of employment because of that individual’s sex.”[18]  Title VII “requires Muldrow to show that the transfer brought about some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition.”[19]  In reviewing the statutory language, the Court determined that “[t]o make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”[20]  The Court held that Title VII does not require an individual to show a “significant” harm or a similar adjective.[21]  The Court rejected the City’s claims regarding the text of Title VII, precedent, and public policy.[22]  Regarding the latter argument, the Court noted, “Had Congress wanted to limit liability for job transfers to those causing a significant disadvantage, it could have done so.”[23]

The Court concluded by reiterating that “Muldrow need show only some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions.  The transfer must have left her worse off, but need not have left her significantly so.”[24]  The Court thus reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings.[25]  Already, the Eleventh Circuit (as noted in previous posts, Florida is in the Eleventh Circuit) has acknowledged the impact of Muldrow in a recent unpublished opinion.[26]

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this topic, or any topic related to labor and employment law, please contact us.

[1] The full opinion is available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-193_q86b.pdf (last visited June 3, 2024).

[2] Muldrow, at *1.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. (emphasis added).  The Court’s opinion was authored by Justice Kagan.  Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment of the Court.

[8] Id.

[9] Id., at *2.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id., at *3.

[15] Id., at *3-4.

[16] Id., at *4.

[17] Id., at *5.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. (citation omitted).

[20] Id., at *6.

[21] Id.

[22] Id., at *8.

[23] Id., at *10.

[24] Id.

[25] Id., at *11.

[26] Regina Bennett v. Butler Co. Bd. of Ed., et al., Case No. 23-10186 (11th Cir. May 24, 2024), available at https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/202310186.pdf (last visited June 3, 2024).

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